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 The Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in 
November of 2006 helped to focus more world attention on the state of the 
African economy, which has seen far too many worries and failures and far too 
few successes.  As the author states "It forced the West to focus on something 
new:  Chinese aid and other forms of economic engagement were sharply on the 
rise in Africa.  China was on a track to become the African continent's largest 
trading partner, outpacing Great Britain and the United States.  Nearly 900 
Chinese companies had invested in Africa by then (2002) – in factories and farms, 
retail shops and oil wells."   
 
  By the time of the summit, China's accelerated move into Africa was 
already a decade old, and Dr. Brautigam proves, by her really dazzling 
knowledge of both Africa and China, that China's presence is never – ever – 
simple or single minded.  China has been active in Africa for more than 50 years, 
and that presence has shifted and evolved in rough congruence with tides 
running in China itself.  Brautigam quite rightly argues that Western observers, 
especially politicians, media, and academics are prone to lock onto a few 
simplistic themes which they endlessly quote to each other: 
 
 1.  China is only after oil and other natural resources 
 2.  Chinese money is always referred to as "aid" 
 3.  China is propping up vicious regimes such as Sudan and Zimbabwe 
 4.  China hurts efforts to promote democracy and human rights 
 5.  China is making corruption worse 
 6.  China relies too much on unfair subsidies such as subsidized loans    
       or export credits 
 7.  Chinese enterprises neglect or ignore environmental and social values   
      and standards 
 8.  Chinese loans to African countries is just adding to unsustainable debt  
      burdens. 
 
 While conceding the elements of truth in each of these assertions, 
Brautigam enthusiastically debunks each of them.  She points out time and time 
again the shallowness of such assessments which lead to misconceptions that are 
then passed from mouth to mouth as revealed truth. 
                                                 
1  Brautigam, Deborah, "The Dragon's Gift: the Real Story of China in Africa", the Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
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 Perhaps the most popular of these misconceptions is that which asserts 
that all flows of Chinese funds into Africa are "aid".  Most people think of foreign 
aid as money given by one government to another to promote economic and 
social development, with military aid a separate adjunct of this government-to-
government policy.  Yet huge amounts of money flow for other reasons.  A lot of 
Chinese activities in Africa are essentially business transactions.  Some are bids 
by Chinese enterprises in response to contract tenders.  Others involve the 
formation of business joint ventures between African and Chinese enterprises.  
Some are the creation of new or expanded Chinese owned businesses in Africa.  
Others are Chinese purchases of stocks or bonds in African companies.  Some are 
Chinese enterprises that are invited to manage African public sector facilities 
such as power stations, railroads or communication systems.  All of these 
business ventures may have political or social dimensions, but they remain 
essentially that  - business ventures. 
 
 Brautigam also asks her readers to consider two other views about China 
in Africa.  First, she suggests that there is little that China is doing, good or bad, 
that has not also been done by Europeans, Americans, Japanese or Russians; and 
all of the criticisms and dark suspicions of China's motives or tactics have also 
descended on other nations. 
 
 Second, although she seems reluctant to do so, Brautigam gently points 
out that most of the sins of omission and commission in Africa are committed by 
African governments themselves.  If China – and others – are accused of 
propping up tyrants, and encouraging corruption, it must be admitted that there 
are all too many tyrants and plenty of native corruption to go around.  The worst 
that can be said is that corruption is so virulent in China itself that one must feel 
that the great bulk of deals between Africans and Chinese will be badly bent in 
some way. 
 
 Time and time again, Brautigam refutes the simplistic assertion that China 
has some "master strategy" to achieve control in Africa.  If there is any coherent 
strategy it is more about China than about Africa, and key to any such strategy is 
the condition of China's State Owned Enterprises (SOE). 
 
 After WW II, many governments around the world including China, 
turned to state socialism in various forms.  While private companies were not 
trusted or favored, the socialist governments still had to operate organizations to 
produce goods and services.  The kind of institution that emerged was generally 
called the State Owned Enterprise (SOE).  SOEs were an innovation in that they 
were neither private companies nor standard government agencies, but were sort 
of half-way independent and were capable of economic activities including 
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manufacturing and retailing for which standard bureaucracies were not suitable.  
The essence however –always - was that the SOEs would remain instruments of 
the government and would remain under government control. 
 
 Gradually however, governments began to recognize that SOEs were 
proving to be a failed experience, and all too many were inefficient, increasingly 
obsolete, and had been operating at substantial deficits.  Governments that had 
counted on deriving larger revenues from their SOEs found instead that 
significant numbers of them were losing money and had to be subsidized and 
propped up using funds that had to be diverted  from other priorities. 
 
 Why did the SOEs prove to be a failed experience? Most critically, the 
basic concept itself proved to be flawed, in that SOEs had too little real 
independence and far too much political intervention which proved to be 
seriously stifling, debilitating and often corrupt. 
 
 The watershed over the fate of Chinese SOEs occurred in 1998, when the 
order was issued to initiate the massive program of what is termed SOE 
divestiture.  From an estimated major 75,000 SOES the goal is to keep only 2-
3,000.  But it turned out that “divestiture” was not the same thing as 
“privatization”.  Many strategies for divestiture were developed.  In many cases, 
the preferred approach of the government has been not to divest at all, but to 
attempt to upgrade the performance of the SOEs it wished to retain.  This 
retention approach was particularly important in what can be called the 
“commanding heights” sectors of the economy – those sectors that drive or 
control many other sectors. In many cases, whole sectors of the Chinese economy 
have been restructured through mergers and acquisitions, consolidations, 
combinations, and “thinning out”.  In other instances, the preferred strategy with 
retained SOEs has been to seek to partner them with solid private sector 
enterprises, either Chinese or foreign invested.   
 
 So it remains true today that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
government relies heavily on their SOEs, along with state owned banks, to 
control and channel the Chinese economy, and these SOES are too important to 
fail.  China's government is using the opportunities in Africa to expand the range 
of its SOEs, and give them valuable experience in operating in the global 
economy in Africa where failure would not damage the heartland. 
 
 Dr. Brautigam identifies many Chinese enterprises by name.  They may be 
called "companies" or "corporations" or "groups", but in fact they are mostly state 
owned and/or controlled enterprises under the direct and demanding control of 
the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party.  Of 38 Chinese 
enterprises identified in Africa by name, it appears that 27 of them are SOEs, 
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including 12 huge engineering enterprises.  In addition, some of the private 
companies benefit from forms of support or subsidy from the Chinese 
government.  And so the question arises:  how much subterranean direction and 
"guidance" comes out of Beijing through these SOEs and client companies, and to 
what effect?  Brautigam doubts that China has any single grand strategy, and she 
is surely right, but it may be that it has several loosely related economic sector 
strategies (pharmaceuticals, communications, public infrastructure, agriculture), 
each shaped to some degree by CCP direction. 
 
 Even if this were to be true, it would not necessarily be ominous.  For 
example, there is nothing wrong if the Chinese government assists its SOEs to 
build one or more pharmaceutical manufacturing plants in Africa, hoping to 
capture a significant share of the continental market. Yet this example can also be 
used to illustrate how a perverse Chinese government could go wrong.  First, the 
government could subsidize these plants so extensively that no other rivals, 
domestic or foreign, could compete with them.  Would the Chinese government 
ever do such a thing?  Of course it might, it has done so extensively in China 
itself to quash private sector competitors to some cherished SOE.  The crucial 
point is this:  for long periods of time, China's SOEs were so poorly managed that 
50% of them were operating at deficits, and others were making only razor thin 
profits.  They had to be propped up repeatedly and expensively by the Chinese 
government.  Finally, the 1998 divestiture program was launched that purged 
thousands of losers.  During this process, the government consolidated, 
rationalized, purged, restructured and refinanced the remaining enterprises.  
China now says it has 2,000-3,000 SOEs; but many have in fact emerged as huge 
new holding companies, some with hundreds of subsidiaries, backed by the 
almost unlimited resources of the Chinese government and its banks, the most 
important of which are themselves SOEs.  Clearly, China cannot afford to have 
these SOEs fail again, and the government will do everything in its power to 
make them succeed. 
 
 And so, many of these huge conglomerates have been showing up in 
Africa to do business, and the Chinese government itself has a high stake in their 
success or failure. Thus, the Chinese government has been using its 
extraordinarily broad power more directly by dealing with the leaders of African 
governments and offering them many inducements such as direct government-
to- government loans, often at very low interest rates; or allowing African goods 
into China duty free; or all of the other attractions and concessions that Dr. 
Brautigam explains so clearly. 
 
 Thus, China's strategic imperative does not seem to be to "take over 
Africa" so much as it is to do whatever it must to make it state owned enterprises 
succeed.  One of the new imperatives, as Dr. Brautigam points out, is to let these 
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SOEs have a greater degree of latitude in deciding which business opportunities 
to pursue, and in what way.  This really means that the CCP and ministries of 
government have got to constrain their urge to apply the kind of political 
meddling that got the SOEs in such trouble in China itself. In addition, or 
perhaps in consequence, the new generation of SOE managers in Africa seem 
remarkably better than their predecessors.  African leaders and even Western 
donors are now more ready to agree that most projects pursued by Chinese 
enterprises are going to be successfully undertaken, and that is all to the good.  
Western donors, and the Africans themselves are tired of watching oceans of 
money dissipated by corruption and bumbling incompetence, disappearing like 
rain on the face of the desert. 
 
 It is probably true that the Chinese government makes choices of which of 
its SOEs it will deploy, and in what sectors of the African economy.  But again, 
Dr. Brautigam urges that this is not unusual nor need it be seen as ominous.  
Other governments and donors, and even private companies, make the same 
kinds of decisions, and nobody thinks they are trying to take over Africa.  "China 
is already changing rapidly, with Chinese leaders moving away from old 
alliances (Mugabe in Zimbwabwe for example), and stepping into an 
unaccustomed new role as a mediator in the Sudan.  Chinese naval patrols were 
rescuing European ships in the pirate infested waters off the coast of Somalia.  
New domestic pressures for enterprise social responsibility and environmental 
and social responsibilities were growing inside China.  New laws were put in 
place for labor rights in China, new guidelines published outlining the 
environmental and social responsibilities of banks and forestry companies 
overseas."    
 
 It is difficult to track how effectively these changes are taking place in 
Africa, just as it is in China itself.  But certainly, the tides are running against any 
theory of Chinese takeover conspiracy. If Dr. Brautigam can't find conspiracy, 
nobody can.  She avoids boiling things down to headlines, but her conclusion is 
that China in Africa is a surprisingly good thing. 
 
 
